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Detaining Combatants by Law or by Order? The
Rule of Lawmaking in the War on Terrorists
Peter Raven-Hansen *
On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush sent tremors
through the United States legal establishment by issuing an order
authorizing military detention and trial by military commission of
individuals whom the President believes to be members of Al Qaeda,
international terrorists, or persons who have aided, abetted, or
harbored such terrorists.' The November 13 Order contemplates
detention without criminal indictment or any charges of wrongdoing,
and trial by military commission without many of the protections
afforded in criminal trials by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments (including trial by jury, open hearings, confrontation,
and a neutral magistrate), and without any review by a civilian court.
Since the November 13 Order appeared to create a parallel military
universe in which individuals could be detained and tried inside the
United States but outside its criminal justice system, and arguably
outside the Constitution, it was greeted with alarm by civil
libertarians as an assault on the rule of law.2
But the November 13 Order and its progeny challenge the rule of
law not only by asserting rules for the detention and trial of alleged
terrorists. Broadly conceived, the rule of law embodies not only rules
of law, but also how such rules are made, what might be called the
rule of lawmaking.3 The form of the November 13 Order (styled a
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1. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War on
Terrorism, Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16,
2001) (hereinafter Nov. 13 Order).
2. See, e.g., Memorandum from Timothy H. Edgar, Legislative Counsel,
American Civil Liberties Union, to Interested Persons, Re: President Bush's Order
Establishing Military Trials in Terrorism Cases (Nov. 29, 2001), available at
http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=9265&c=1 ;
Alliance for Justice, et. al., Statement in Opposition to the Use of the Military
Commissions Authorized By President Bush and the Department of Justice (Jan.
2003), available at http://www.cnss.org/somc.doc; Report, Comm. on Military
Affairs and Justice, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Inter Arma Silent
Leges: In Times of Armed Conflict, Should the Laws Be Silent? (Dec. 2001),
available at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/should-the-laws.pdf.
Three cases decided by the United States Supreme Court last term involved
challenges to military detention of alleged combatants. See, e.g., Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004);
Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). The November 13 Order was not addressed
in Rasul, and was not directly at issue in Hamdi or Padilla, but it rests on the same
legal reasoning as the detentions challenged in the latter cases.
3. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, & Elizabeth Garrett,
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"Military Order"), the way it was promulgated (without prior notice,
or opportunity for legislative or public deliberation), and the
procedures it spawned (by the subsequent promulgation of "Military
Commission Orders" and "Instructions") all posed challenges to the
rule of lawmaking. Even if the November 13 Order's rules for
military detention and trial are lawful,4 a serious question remains
whether any government that operates under the rule of law should
make and declare such rules by military order, rather than by laws
that are publicly deliberated, transparent, published, and judicially
reviewable.
In this essay, I assert that ours should not. Further, I suggest that
the war on terrorism provides no reason to depart from the
conventional rule of lawmaking-the procedures a government
under the rule of law conventionally follows in making law. Instead,
I argue that the exigencies of that war especially require observance
of the rule of lawmaking when the executive asserts liberty-and
life-threatening military powers at home.
Part I of this essay traces the procedural history of the Military
Order and other closely related assertions of military authority,
building on the excellent history compiled by Eugene Fidell through
the summer of 2003.6 Part II briefly speculates how the November
13 Military Order, Military Commission Orders, and Military
Commission Instructions might have been promulgated had the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) applied. Finally, Part Ill
addresses two rebuttals to this line of thought: that military orders
and their progeny are exempt from the APA procedures and that, in
Legislation and Statutory Interpretation 175-81 (2000) (explaining "due process of
lawmaking"); Hans Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197
(1976); Laurence Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 269
(1975).
4. The Court has not yet ruled on the legality of the November 13 Order, but
the reasoning of Hamdi suggests that the Court would uphold the Order.
5. The Administrative Procedure Act sets out procedures for the making of
legislative regulations by administrative agencies that have been delegated
rulemaking authority. These include prior published notice, public comment,
publication of a final rule with a statement of basis and purpose, delayed effective
date, etc. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000). See infra Part II. Congress itself does not
follow these same procedures, of course, but its process is substantially transparent,
it often allows for public input, and its law is published.
6. Eugene R. Fidell, Military Commissions & Administrative Law, 6 Green
Bag 379 (2003). My debt to Fidell will be apparent to anyone who reads his article.
He has also continued to collect pertinent military authorities and commentary on
the website of the National Institute of Military Justice, www.nimj.org, which
remains the best single source for viewing all pertinent public information about
asserted post 9/11 military detention and military commission authority. See also
National Institute of Military Justice, Military Commission Instructions Sourcebook
(2003).
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any case, normal lawmaking procedures are impracticable in the
national security emergency created by the 9/11 attacks.
I. THE MAKING OF THE MILITARY ORDER AND ITS PROGENY
A. The November 13, 2001, Order
The November 13 Military Order was issued without prior notice
or opportunity for public comment. The internal administrative
process for its issuance is still unknown, but reportedly two former
senior officials in the Department of Justice first suggested that
military commissions be used to try suspected terrorists.7 The
Office of Legal Counsel was tasked with advising about the legality
of this option, although its opinion has not yet been publicly
disclosed. It would have been logical to have given military
lawyers the same charge, if for no other reason than to take
advantage of their extensive firsthand experience with courts-martial
and to help them define the role that they would presumably be
required to play under the November 13 Order. But after the Order
was promulgated, media reports stated that their advice had either
gone unsolicited or ignored in its drafting.9 In any case, it is also
likely, based on the procedures used in formulating subsequent
legally controversial Administration counter-terrorist initiatives, that
any legal advice from the Office of Legal Counsel and the
Department of Defense was channeled through and synthesized in
the office of White House Counsel and former judge Alberto R.
Gonzales. l
7. Steven Brill, After: How America Confronted the September 12 Era
125-26 (2003).
8. Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, for Alberto R. Gonzales, Re: Legality of the Use of
Military Commissions to Try Terrorists (Nov. 6,2001). As far as I have been able
to determine, this memorandum has not yet been made public, and I have confirmed
its existence only from a footnote in another, recently leaked draft memorandum by
the Office of Legal Counsel. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§
2340-2340A 36 n.19 (Aug. 1, 2002).
9. John Mintz, Extended Detention in Cuba Mulled; Officials Indicate
Guantanamo Bay Could Hold Tribunals, Carry Out Sentences, Wash. Post, Feb. 13,
2002, at A 16.
10. Recent disclosures about the Administration's adoption of interrogation
policies in the war on terrorism indicate, for example, that an extensive legal
opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel was directed to Judge Gonzales, who
synthesized it in a memorandum and presumably a briefing for the President. See
Document Trail: A Look at How Interrogation Policy Evolved Within the Bush
Administration, Wash. Post, June 24, 2004, at A6.
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As noted above, the November 13 Order drew immediate and
sustained criticism from civil libertarians, the bar, and academia. In
response, Judge Gonzales offered three rebuttals on behalf of the
Administration." First, he emphasized that the Order expressly
applied only to non-citizens. 2  Criticism was "based on
misconceptions," explained Judge Gonzales, among them presumably
the misconception that the President had ordered the military to
detain Americans.1 3 Moreover, it was "totally unfounded" for critics
to assert that the November 13 Order would be applied to "green card
holders," Judge Gonzales told a bar association meeting.' Treating
permanent resident aliens (to whom green cards are issued) like
United States citizens and therefore outside the Military Order is
consistent with existing national law governing surveillance and
intelligence collection,' which gives such aliens the same protections
as United States citizens in recognition of their substantial and
permanent connections to the United States. Yet nothing in the text
of the November 13 Order exempts permanent resident aliens. The
Order applies without differentiation to "any individual who is not a
United States citizen" who otherwise meets its requirements. 16 Thus,
Judge Gonzales' explanation effectively amended the Order.
Second, Judge Gonzales emphasized that the November 13 Order
applied only to "enemy war criminals," persons "chargeable with
offenses against the international laws of war, like targeting civilians
or hiding in civilian populations and refusing to bear arms openly."' 7
The implication was that critics who raised the specter of military
arrests and trial for ordinary crimes or for nothing at all were thus
again irresponsibly wide of the mark. The November 13 Order,
however, expressly declares it necessary for individuals subject to it
to be tried "for violations of the laws of war and other applicable
laws by military tribunals." 8 Judge Gonzales' explanation, therefore,
again verbally amended, or at least narrowed, the Order.
11. Alberto R. Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30,
2001, at A27.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Author's Notes, Conference of the American Bar Ass'n, Standing Comm.
on Law and Nat'l Sec. (Nov. 30,2001) (attributing to Judge Gonzales the statement
that criticism that the Nov. 13 Order was "targeting green card holders is totally
unfounded"). To be fair, Judge Gonzales did not mention permanent resident aliens
per se, but his protest presumably referred to them.
15. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(l) (2000); Exec.
Order No. 12,333, § 3.4(I), 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981).
16. Nov. 13 Order, supra note 1, at § 2(a).
17. Gonzales, supra note 11.
18. Nov. 13 Order, supra note 1, at § 1(e) (emphasis added).
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Third, the Administration responded vigorously to criticism that
the November 13 Order prohibited judicial review. The November
13 Order provides that an individual subject to it
shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any
proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy
or proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in (i) any
court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court
of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal. 9
The peculiarly archaic formalism, "privileged to seek," appears in no
current statutory provision regarding judicial review. Instead, it was
drawn from a World War II order by President Franklin Roosevelt
issued in response to the capture of eight German saboteurs in the
United States. After he told Attorney General Francis Biddle, "I
want one thing clearly understood, Francis. I won't hand them over
to any United States Marshal armed with a writ of habeas corpus,"20
Roosevelt signed a proclamation entitled Denying Certain Enemies
Access to the Courts of the United States and authorizing their trial
by military commission under the laws of war.2' The proclamation's
statement that such enemies "shall not be privileged to seek any
remedy" was an unmistakable reference to the Suspension Clause of
the Constitution, which speaks of "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus."22 Indeed, Biddle told Roosevelt that this language
in the proclamation would have "the same practical results" as
suspending the writ of habeas corpus without actually taking such
action.23 Given this lineage, President Bush's November 13 Order
unmistakably purports to deny individuals subject to it the privilege
of seeking the writ of habeas corpus or any other remedy "directly or
indirectly" in any court.24
Despite the Order's text and this lineage, however, Judge
Gonzales flatly asserted that "[t]he order preserves judicial review in
civilian courts. 25 This Orwellian assertion may have been based on
19. Id. at § 7(b)(2).
20. See Gary Cohen, The Keystone Kommandos, The Atlantic Monthly, Feb.
2002, at 53; Louis Fisher, Bush Can't Rely on the FDR Precedent, L.A. Times,
Dec. 2, 2001, at M3.
21. Proclamation No. 2561, Denying Certain Enemies Access to the Courts of
the United States, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942), reprinted at 10 U.S.C. § 906
(2000).
22. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (emphasis added) ("The privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
23. George Lardner, Jr., Nazi Saboteurs Captured!, Wash. Post Magazine, Jan.
13, 2002, at 16.
24. Nov. 13 Order, supra note 1, at § 7(b)(2).
25. Gonzales, supra note 11.
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the fact that the United States Supreme Court had rejected
Roosevelt's effort to head off habeas review in the saboteurs' case,26
and that the Bush Administration therefore anticipated that the
present Supreme Court would likewise reject the November 13
Order's denial of any judicial remedy.27 If so, surely a more direct
textual path existed to admitting judicial review. The
Administration's explanation was tantamount to asserting, "We are
confident that the courts will ignore our futile effort to deny habeas
just as the Supreme Court did last time."
While these "verbal amendments" cumulatively may have given
some reassurance to the November 13 Order's critics, they also
created a sizable gap between what the Order said and what the
Administration claimed it meant, calling to mind the (slightly
paraphrased) assertion made by former Attorney General John
Mitchell's during the Nixon Administration, "Watch what we do,
instead of what we say. 2 8
B. The Procedures for Implementing the November 13, 2001,
Order
The Administration stressed that the regime of military detention
and trial was still a work in progress, with implementing details and
procedures yet to come. Their evolution, however, was itself an
adventure in executive lawmaking.
At first, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reportedly sought
advice about procedures from nine prominent civilian lawyers and
law professors, including Newton Minnow, formerly Chair of the
Federal Communications Commission; Lloyd Cutler, former White
House Counsel to President Bill Clinton; William Webster, former
federal judge and Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and
several retired General Counsels of the Department of Defense.29
What they seemed to have in common was that they were civilians,
out of the government, and known to Secretary Rumsfeld. They may
well have had some moderating effect on the first set of procedures
for military commissions (which seemingly backed off some of the
26. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 S. Ct. 2 (1942).
27. See Michael Chertoff, Law, Loyalty, and Terror: Our Legal Response to
the Post-9/JJ World, 9 Weekly Standard 16 (2003) ("[T]he Bush administration
made it clear in issuing the order that the administration anticipated courts would
exercise habeas jurisdiction over commission defendants...."). Chertoff was head
of the Criminal Division in the Department of Justice when the November 13 Order
was issued. Id.
28. Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations 4 (Suzy Platted., 1989).
29. Brill, supra note 7, at 240-41,266; Charles Lane, Terrorist Tribunal Rights
Are Expanded; Draft Specifies Appeals, Unanimity on Death Penalty, Wash. Post,
Dec. 28, 2001, at Al.
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more severe provisions of the November 13 Order).30 But we do not
presently know, because their advice, if any, was solicited and
received in secret. They were not designated as an advisory
committee; their communications, if they were in writing, have not
been published; and the Administration did not discuss them in any
subsequent public disclosure. Nor was any public notice of proposed
procedures or opportunity for public comment ever given, despite
calls for it from Fidell and the President of the American Bar
Association.3'
Instead, the first set of procedures for military commission trials
pursuant to the November 13 Order were issued as final on March
2002,32 though not published in the Federal Register for another year
when they were finally published together with Military Commission
Instructions that had been subsequently issued to carry them out.33
"[T]he need to move decisively and expeditiously in the ongoing war
against terrorism" was cited by the Department of Defense as a
justification for issuing final procedures without involving the public
in the lawmaking process.'
Any need for expedition, however, was belied by the snail's pace
of the actual lawmaking process. Although the first set of procedures
was developed in just under four months, the eight sets of "Military
Commission Instructions" that implemented them were developed
over the course of the ensuing thirteen months. This left ample time
to solicit and consider public comments. In fact, the Department of
Defense did issue an informal press release inviting comments by fax
on Military Commission Instruction No. 2, setting out the crimes to
be tried by military commissions and their elements.35 We know that
some organizations accepted this invitation because they posted their
comments on the internet or otherwise publicized them. The
Department of Defense, however, refused to disclose the comments
it received or to acknowledge whether and, if so, how it had
considered them.36
In any event, the Department seems not to have appreciated this
experience with public comments. It declined to invite even informal
30. So Fidell speculates. Fidell, supra note 6, at 381-82 & n.12.
31. Id. at 382 n.14 (citing letters).
32. Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1, Procedures for
Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism (March 21, 2002), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321 ord.pdf.
33. 68 Fed. Reg. 39,374 (July 1, 2003).
34. Fidell, supra note 6, at 382 n.16 (citing Letter from William J. Haynes,
General Counsel, Dep't of Defense, to Robert E. Hirshon, President, American Bar
Ass'n, March 19, 2002).
35. Id. at 383.
36. Id.
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comments for seven other Military Commission Instructions. It
simply issued them internally as final in April 2003, and then made
them public several days later by posting them on the Department's
website and conducting a press briefing.3 -Again, the Department was
in no rush to publish them more officially in the Federal Register.
That happened only two months later,38 just before the Administration
announced the selection of the first six detainees for possible military
trial.3' The published instructions made no effort to explain their basis
and purpose, let alone to make any mention of public comments or
acknowledgment of public concerns and critiques.
Yet even the published instructions, it turned out, were not final.
Military Commission Instruction No. 5 proposed restrictions on
defense counsel in military commission trials so severe that the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers unanimously
opined it would be unethical for a defense lawyer to accept them.4 ° In
preparing an annual supplement to my casebook on national security
law, I therefore quoted from the most controversial of these
instructions in order to flag the issue in a proposed note.41 When my
co-author read my draft, however, he telephoned to advise me that I
had misquoted the instruction. I placed the instruction published in
the Federal Register before me; he took out the same instruction he
had downloaded from the Department of Defense website in front of
him; and we were both right. The Department had apparently
changed the instruction on its website to meet some of the objections
of the defense bar, but had neither identified the changes on the
website, changed the original date of the instruction on the website,
nor made any effort to reflect the changes in the formally published
version in the Federal Register. Such "e-tampering," in Fidell's nice
phrase,42 ironically confirms the potential contribution of public
comment on the instructions, but it also leaves academics who study
or teach the Military Commission Instructions, and more seriously,
defense lawyers who may have to operate under them, unable to trust
the Federal Register or even materials posted on the Department of
Defense website without rereading them continuously for undisclosed
changes.
37. Id. at 383-84.
38. 68 Fed. Reg. 39,374 (July 1, 2003).
39. Fidell, supra note 6, at 384.
40. Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Resolution of the NACDL
Board of Directors Regarding Participation in Military Tribunals, (Aug. 2, 2003),
available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/0/
81b7ab77954cb03385256e4a0052e6fa?OpenDocument.
41. See Steven Dycus, Arthur L. Berney, William C. Banks, and Peter Raven-
Hansen, 2003-2004 Supplement: National Security Law 97-98 (3d ed. Supp.
2003).
42. Fidell, supra note 6, at 384.
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C. The "Order" for Military Detention of Hamdi and Padilla
At least the latest Military Commission Instructions, the
procedures in Military Conmmission Order No. 1, and, of course, the
November 13 Military Order itself were published either in the
Federal Register or on the Department of Defense website.
Incredibly, the same cannot be said at this writing of the President's
subsequent order for the military detention of two United States
citizens whom he has determined are members of or associated
with.43 Despite the Administration's sometimes indignant correction
of its critics' "misconception" of the November 13 Military Order by
its insistence that the Order would not be applied to United States
citizens, just six months after the Order was issued President Bush
directed the military to detain United States citizens Yaser Hamdi
and Jose Padilla without charges or indictment, initial access to
lawyers, any trial date, or prior judicial authority. Technically, this
detention was not ordered under the November 13 Order, because it
still applies on its face only to non-citizens.
But then, what law is it authorized under? None that has been
published, even in the form of a military order. In fact, when Padilla
eventually challenged his detention, the government produced a
redacted written directive by President Bush directing Secretary
Rumsfeld to take Padilla into military custody. But, unlike the
November 13 Military Order and its procedural progeny, the June 9
directive does not purport to declare any general rules for the military
detention of United States citizens or to apply to anyone but Jose
Padilla. As to him, if the bare directive constitutes its own legal
authority on some bootstrapping theory, it is tantamount to saying
that a United States citizen can be held in military detention just
because the President says so.
43. Yaser Essam Hamdi was captured by Northern Alliance forces in
Afghanistan and turned over to United States military custody. When it was
discovered that he was a United States citizen, he was moved to the United States
in April 2002, where he is being confined in the Norfolk Naval Brig. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). In October 2004, Hamdi was released to Saudi
Arabia after almost three years of military detention. See Jerry Markon, Hamdi
Returned to Saudi Arabia, Wash. Post, Oct. 12, 2004, at A2. Jose Padilla, an
American citizen, was arrested in Chicago and detained as a material witness before
being transferred to military custody on June 9, 2002, for detention as an enemy
combatant. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). Hamdi and Padilla are the
only United States citizens known to be in military detention as enemy combatants
at this writing. The Administration has disclosed that one non-citizen arrested in
the United States, Qatar national Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, has also been
designated an enemy combatant and transferred to military custody. See Eric
Lichtblau, Bush Declares Student an Enemy Combatant, N.Y. Times, June 24,
2003, at A15.
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In short, for all that has been disclosed to date, there is no
published law or even military order specifically authorizing the
military detention of United States citizens or setting out procedures
for such detention. This is not to say that such detention is unlawful.
In Hamdi, five Justices found that the Authorization for the Use of
Military Force Joint Resolution passed immediately after the 9/11
attacks, authorizing the President to "use all necessary and
appropriate force" against the perpetrators of the attacks and those
who aided or harbored them,' was sufficient to authorize even the
detention of a United States citizen if he is an enemy combatant.
Whether the same statute authorizes detention of a citizen in Padilla' s
shoes is unclear. The November 13 Order cites two other statutes,
title 10, section 821, saving the jurisdiction of military commissions
over offenses that by statute "or by the law of war may be tried by
military commissions," and title 10, section 836, authorizing the
President to prescribe procedures for military commissions. But
these statutes beg the question of the authority and content of the
common law of war, which is unwritten, unclear, and certainly, as
applied to the detention of United States citizens, largely
unelaborated anywhere but in the "post-hoc rationalization" by
counsel45 in briefs filed by the government in response to challenges
by the citizen-detainees. Even after Hamdi, it is arguably still fair to
assert that together these authorities do not add up to an express and
specific legal rule regulating the military detention of United States
citizens in the United States. It is still true, as a circuit court judge
who agreed with the government that the President has authority to
order military detention of Padilla lamented, that "[o]ne of the more
troubling aspects of Mr. Padilla' s detention is that it is undefined by
statute or Presidential Order."46 Instead of law which you "can look
up," we were presented with law by ipse dixit. The Hamdi decision
has not cured the problem because its splintered and guarded
reasoning still leaves the legal scope of military detention of United
States citizens unclear.
D. Designating United States Citizens as Enemy Combatants
Acknowledging that the process for detaining United States
citizens may have looked like a "black box that raises the specter of
arbitrary action," Judge Gonzales recently decided to disclose to a bar
44. Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
45. Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69, 83 S. Ct.
239, 245-46 (1962).
46. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 733 (2d Cir. 2003) (Wesley, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 64840
PETER RA VEN-HANSEN
meeting how United States citizens are selected for military
detention. 47  He then described an impressively elaborate inter-
agency process for designating a citizen an "enemy combatant" who
could be subjected to military detention, that incorporated
information developed by the Department of Defense, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Justice, written
assessments by the same agencies, a formal legal opinion by the
Office of Legal Counsel, recommendations by the Attorney General
and the Secretary of Defense, and a final recommendation to and
briefing for the President by the White House Counsel. At the same
time, however, Judge Gonzales cautioned that "there is no rigid
process for making such determinations-and certainly no particular
mechanism required by law. Rather, these are the steps that we have
taken in our discretion to ensure a thoroughly vetted and reasoned
exercise of presidential power."48 The process he disclosed, in other
words, is provided by executive grace, not by law.
11. How THE RULES WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE UNDER THE APA
So what? One answer is to consider how the rules governing
military detention and trial by military commission of United States
citizens would have been made if the APA had applied.
First, the public-a public that includes present and former
military lawyers with a highly relevant expertise in the subject,
many of whom were reportedly ignored, at least initially, in the
making of the November 13 Orders and instructions-would have
had notice that such rules were being considered. A general notice
of proposed rulemaking would have been published in the Federal
Register, time permitting.49 The notice would have stated the terms
or substance of the proposed rule. In addition, it would have
identified "the legal authority under which the rule is proposed."5 °
Of course, that identification would not necessarily have been any
more illuminating than the citation in the November 13 Order of the
Authorization for the Use of Military Force Resolution and title 10,
sections 821 and 836, but even a comparably conclusory
identification of authority for detaining United States citizens would
be more than we presently can find outside of government litigation
briefs.
47. Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Remarks at the American
Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on Law and Nat'l Sec. 11 (Feb. 24, 2004) (transcript
available at http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/judge-gonzales.pdf).
48. Id., at 7.
49. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000).
50. Id. § 553(b)(2).
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Interested persons would have been afforded "an opportunity to
participate in the rule making" by submitting comments.5' The
administration, in turn, would have been obliged to consider relevant
comments.52
The administration then would have had to prepare and
incorporate into the final rules a concise general statement of basis
and purpose.53 It is possible that such a statement would be no more
elaborate than the "findings" which the President reported in his
November 13 Order, but it is also quite possible that they would be
informed and altered by the public comments and attendant
consideration. It is even possible that the "basis" would have
included a reasoned explanation of the authority for military
detention and trial by military commission of United States citizens,
for which we must now search the government's litigation briefs
without comparable assurance that they are authoritative. This
possibility carries added importance in the field of national security,
which has comparatively few judicial precedents to draw upon. In
this field, the executive's own legal explanations often have to
substitute for judicial precedents in articulating the law.
The resulting rules for detention and trial by military commission,
with the accompanying statement of basis and purpose, however
elaborate, would have been published in the Federal Register either
before, or on their effective date, if there were good cause for
waiving the normal thirty-day delay. 4
Just as important, any changes to the rules would have had to
have been made in the same way, absent good cause. Even if the
notice-and-comment procedures could be waived for good cause, the
changes would have had to be published in the Federal Register.
You could "look it up" without having to deconstruct e-tampering on
the Department of Defense website to confirm what rules are
currently in effect.
Finally, the rules would presumptively be subject to some level
of judicial scrutiny. As shown by the evolution of the pending
litigation challenging military detentions, the courts have stepped into
the breach anyway, but the APA and modem administrative law
reminds us that judicial review is ordinarily the sine qua non of
executive discretion. Without it, we lose the judicial check on
arbitrary executive action, weaken the legislative check, and come to
rely undependably on the executive to check itself.
51. Id. § 553(c).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. § 553(d).
55. Id. §§ 702, 706 (2000).
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III. BUT THE APA DOES NOT APPLY AND THIS IS WAR
My foregoing speculation is a ringing, if simplistic, homage to
modem American administrative procedure, but it is vulnerable to at
least two serious rebuttals. The first is that the APA expressly
exempts "military commissions," generally,"6 and "military ...
function[s]," specifically, from its rulemaking procedures.57 Echoing
others, I argue below, echoing others, that perhaps it should not, but
more importantly, that its procedures, or ones very like them, are
required by the rule of lawmaking in any case. The second and more
serious rebuttal is that, while APA-like rules of lawmaking are well-
suited to making laws to regulate sulphur dioxide emissions or
medicare benefits, they are impracticable, if not dangerous, when the
President acts "for reasons of national security" in a war on terrorism.
I respond that this proposition depends on what those reasons are and
conclude that the war power the President asserts is reason to insist
on, and not to suspend, the rules of lawmaking.
A. The APA Does Not Apply... (But Its Rules of Lawmaking
Should)
This rebuttal is unquestionably correct.58 The Administration was
not required to follow the APA's rulemaking requirements or its
provisions forjudicial review for the "military function" of detaining
and trying United States citizens by military commission. The
published Military Commission Instructions expressly invoke this
exemption from rulemaking,59 and even the November 13 Order
strategically uses the term "military function" to characterize the
promulgation of Erocedures by the Secretary of Defense which the
Order authorizes.
One answer to this argument is that the exemption always was
overbroad and that its abolition was recommended at least as early as
1972 by administrative law experts,6" and again in 1974 by the widely
56. Id. §§ 551(1)(F) (excluding military commissions from definition of
agency), 701 (b)(1)(F) (same for purposes of judicial review provisions).
57. Id. § 553(a)(1).
58. But see Fidell, supra note 6, at 380-81 & n.5 (raising a textual issue
concerning the scope of the "military commission" exemption, but finding that the
broader "military function" exemption probably makes the issue moot).
59. 68 Fed. Reg. 39,374 (July 1, 2003) ("It has been certified that 32 CFR part
9 [the Instructions] is as a military function of the United States and exempt from
administrative procedures for rulemaking").
60. Nov. 13 Order, supra note 1, at §§ 4(b), 6.
61. See Arthur E. Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Function Rule-making
Under the APA, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 221 (1972); see also Project: Federal
Administrative Law Developments-] 969, 1970 Duke L.J. 67, 109-10 (the solution
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respected Administrative Conference of the United States.62 Those
who urged the repeal of the exemption reasoned that it was
unnecessary and unwarranted because the APA provided other
exemptions from following rulemaking procedures when it was
"impracticable, unnecessary or contrary to public interest" to follow
the procedures.63 In fact, the Department of Defense followed this
reasoning in important rulemakings, voluntarily adopting notice-and-
comment procedures to issue some regulations that it finds have a
substantial and direct impact on the public.' Most notably, the
Department has also voluntarily edged towards using APA-like
notice-and-comment procedures for making changes to the Manual
for Courts-Martial.6p Thus, the Department itself has set the
precedent for using such procedures in the making of procedures for
military trial and rules which substantially impact the public, as
surely would the military detention and trial of United States citizens.
But the better answer to the APA-does-not-apply argument is that
the Administration should use APA-like procedures in making the
rules of military detention and commission trial of terrorist suspects
not because they are required by the APA, but because they are
required by the rule of lawmaking and good sense. I speculated
above about how the Military Order and its progeny might have been
made under the APA not to make a case for applying the APA or
rescinding its military function exemption,' but to illustrate what the
procedure should look like in any case.
to eliminating exemptions to rulemaking lies in the "good cause" provision of 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B)); see generally Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules,
Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like - Should Federal Agencies
Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 Duke L.J. 1311, 1373 (1992) (agencies should
observe rulemaking procedures whenever "feasible and appropriate").
62. Admin. Conference of U.S., Elimination of the "Military or Foreign
Affairs" Exemption from APA Rulemaking Requirements, 39 Fed. Reg. 4847 (Feb.
7, 1974). The Administrative Conference is now defunct, but it was so well
regarded and useful that Justice Antonin Scalia, himself a former professor of
Administrative Law, recently urged Congress to bring it back. See Hearing on the
Reauthorization of the Admin. Conference of the U.S. Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Admin. Law of the H.R. Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. (May 20,
2004) (statement of Antonin Scalia, Supreme Court Justice).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2000).
64. See 32 C.F.R. Pt. 336 (2002).
65. See Fidell, supra note 6, at 386; Kevin J. Barry, Modernizing the Manual
for Courts-Martial Rule-Making Process: A Work in Progress, 165 Mil. L. Rev.
237 (2000).
66. Although that case is a good one. It was the very same chaos of
unpredictable administrative lawmaking, secret law, casual and undisclosed
changes in the law, inconsistency, and general sloppiness that describes the history
of the Military Order and its progeny that prompted the enactment of the Federal
Register Act and the APA. The recent chaos is more evidence that the exemption
should be rescinded in substantial part.
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It therefore is useful to raise the level of abstraction and consider
the rule of lawmaking, as such. Although reasonable lawyers will
differ on the details, I suggest that the following principles are
basic. First, the rule of lawmaking insists ideally on the executive's
identification of express and specific statutory lawmaking authority.
Such authority anchors executive lawmaking in a representative
consensus and brings an element of definiteness, if not clarity, to the
subsidiary lawmaking process. The Military Order's identification
of title 10, section 836, delegating authority to the President to
prescribe by regulations the procedures for military commissions is
one such anchor, but, as noted above, begs the antecedent question of
whether the President enjoys authority to order military detention and
trial by military commission of United States citizens in the United
States, whatever procedures he employs. Even assuming that he has
derived that authority by inference from some amalgam of the
unwritten common law of war, the common law savings clause in
section 821, and the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Joint
Resolution (a conclusion that is premature for Padilla's detention, at
this writing), this foundational principle of the rule of lawmaking
counsels in favor of his seeking express and more specific statutory
authority from Congress for such an extraordinary power over
American citizens.
Second, the rule of lawmaking requires procedural regularity-
clear, consistent and predictable procedures consistently followed for
making the rules. This is especially true when the resulting rules are
as controversial as those declared by the November 13 Order and
implicated in the subsequent military detention of United States
citizens. When the substantive rules of law are so controversial and
debatable, as a matter of policy, that we cannot tell if they are right,
procedural regularity in their making provides some compensating
assurance.68 Judge Gonzales therefore is wrong in one important
sense when he blithely asserts that "no rigid process ... [or]
67. See Dianne P. Wood, The Rule of Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 455,457-58 (2003) (comparing rule-of-law principles identified by scholars);
Eskridge, Frickey, & Garrett, supra note 3; Linde, supra note 3; Tribe, supra note
3.
68. Captain Kevin J. Barry has made the same argument for modernizing the
rulemaking procedures for the Manual of Courts-Martial:
Individual rules, once adopted, may not always be viewed as the "best"
rules possible: the same rule might be viewed as overly harsh or overly
intrusive by some, while others may view it as not being sufficiently
rigorous to preserve the commander's authority and good order and
discipline. Accordingly, it is of crucial importance that the process used
for adopting the rules have fundamental integrity and be uniformly viewed
as appropriate and fair.
Barry, supra note 65, at 243.
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particular mechanism [for deciding whether a United States citizen
is an enemy combatant is] required by law. 69 While it is true that
there is no particular antecedent process that the Administration has
to use, the rule of law posits that some regular process is required to
give assurance to a justifiably nervous legal community and polity
that the controversial substantive result-a status determination that
affects the liberty of a United States citizen-is correct. Further, that
process must itself be established with procedural regularity pursuant
to the rule of lawmaking. In this respect, Judge Chertoff, now at
some objective remove from the front lines where he formerly toiled
as head of the Criminal Division after 9/11, has the better view: "We
need to debate a long-term and sustainable architecture for the
process of determining when, why, and for how long someone may
be detained as an enemy combatant, and what judicial review should
be available. 7 °
His call for debate suggests a third element of the rule of
lawmaking: opportunity for public input. Such opportunity is
required for several reasons. First, it may improve the quality of the
resulting law. Consider, for example, the result if military lawyers
had an early opportunity to make suggestions regarding the
November 13 Order or Military Commission Order No. 1, or if the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers or the American
Bar Association had an early opportunity for input into the Military
Commission Instructions regarding defense counsel. Indeed, we do
not have to speculate about the latter; the Department of Defense
ultimately relaxed strictures on defense counsel in response to public
criticism. This experience suggests that public input can be
influential not just because it may convince that executive of a way
to improve the final rule, but also because it may force the executive
to change the rule to make it more acceptable to the public, reflecting
what Neal Devins calls the "potency of social norms.., to constrain
administration overreaching. 71 Thus, a second reason to provide the
opportunity for public input is that it increases the likelihood of
public acceptance of the resulting law. It is easier for one to tolerate
even an imperfect law if she is satisfied that her views were at least
heard and seriously considered in its making, whether or not they
were accepted.
Of course, such opportunity for public input presupposes notice
of the proposed rulemaking, and the operation of social norms also
presupposes publication of the result. In a word, transparency is
69. Gonzales, supra note 47, at 12.
70. Chertoff, supra note 27, at 3.
71. Neal Devins, Congress, Civil Liberties, and the War on Terrorism, 11 Wm.
& Mary Bill Rts. J. 1139, 1149 (2003).
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another basic principle of the rule of lawmaking. Transparency
requires that the rules also be written and published. "From its birth,"
Judge Wood reminds us, "the United States has been a country based
on written law. 72 This is true even of common law rules; "you can
look it up," is an Americanism central to the rule of law and
lawmaking. Yet, while a non-citizen could look up the November 13
Order in the Federal Register, United States citizens Hamdi and
Padilla, ironically, could not look up the law governing their detention
before the Hamdi decision. Even after that decision, the law the
President purports to invoke to detain United States citizens is still
largely "undefined," as Judge Wesley put it. Transparency reinforces
the myth of the rule of law: that ours is a government of law, not men.
Little wonder that many Americans see what Judge Gonzales calls
"the specter of arbitrary action" by a few men in the military detention
of United States citizens, instead of decisions by law.
Finally, the rule of lawmaking insists at some stage of the process
on the availability of judicial review. Judicial review is traditionally
regarded as a necessary check even when the President directs "that
a congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by
Congress., 73 Afortiorari, it is needed when the President "directs [by
military order] that a presidential policy be executed in a manner
prescribed by the President. '74  Fortunately, notwithstanding the
Military Order's effort to deny any judicial review, the courts have to
date unanimously insisted on a role-no matter how deferential-in
deciding the legality of military detention of United States citizens.75
That role, however, should have been built clearly into the November
13 Order from the start. Relying on the courts to ignore the Order's
attempt to cut off judicial review is not an honest substitute.
B. But This Is War... (Exactly!)
The other rebuttal to the demands of the rule of lawmaking is that
they are traditionally used in the mundane regulation of everyday
activities and business, where we can afford them, but this is war,
72. Wood, supra note 67, at 457.
73. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588, 72 S. Ct.
863,867 (1952). This, of course, is the premise of the APA presumption ofjudicial
review. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S. Ct. 1507 (1967);
see generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 17.6 (2002).
74. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588, 72 S. Ct. at 867.
75. Indeed, Judge Chertoff surmises that the availability ofjudicial review and
the procedural regularity of executive action are inversely related principles of the
rule of national security lawmaking, the courts being more willing to give review
the less procedural regularity they detect in the executive's assertion of a national
security authority. See Michael Chertoff, Judicial Review of the President's
Decisions as Commander in Chief, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 1289, 1302 (2003).
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mandating an exception. Supporters of this position posit that the
September 11 attacks placed us in a continuing national security
emergency in which life and liberty are at stake, and in which rule-of-
lawmaking procedures are impracticable and too costly. They
suggest that war and national emergency call uniquely on executive
initiative, which cannot be shackled by essentially peacetime
lawmaking requirements. There is more than an echo of this rebuttal
in Judge Gonzales' explanation for the Administration's two-year
silence about the process for deciding whether United States citizens
are enemy combatants subject to military detention: the secrecy was
"largely for reasons of national security."7 6 "Reasons of national
security" sounds chillingly like the "reasons of state," invoked by
more than one monarch in history to justify authoritarian action.
Whether reasons of national security require a departure from the law
of rulemaking, however, depends on what those reasons are.
If the reason is time-urgency-that the war or emergency will not
brook the tedious delay of notice and public input, the usually glacial
pace of public lawmaking-the reason is sometimes sound. When
the November 13 Order was issued, for example, we had just
commenced military operations in Afghanistan that would require
military detention of combatants on the battlefield and possibly off
it, as well. Rapid issuance of the November 13 Order without
opportunity for public input could be defended on the ground that it
was necessary to have a detention policy in place before the first
combatants were captured. The Department of Defense's invocation
of "the need to move decisively and expeditiously in the ongoing war
against terrorism" thus might have been justified for the November
13 Order itself.
But the rule of lawmaking codified in the APA is no stranger to
time-urgency. It permits administrative agencies to issue rules first,
and take public comments later, and to place them into effect at the
same time they are published, for good cause." The oxymoron
"interim final rules" is familiar to administrative lawyers.
In any case, any time-urgency in November 2001 had long since
passed by the time the Department of Defense promulgated Military
Commission Procedures and Instructions. It certainly passed
sometime during the two-year detention of Hamdi and Padilla, well
before Judge Gonzales disclosed the procedure for deciding United
States citizen status for purposes of detention. Moreover, time-
urgency does not dispense with other elements of the rule of
76. Gonzales, supra note 47, at 11.
77. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(B), 553(d)(3) (2000). See Pierce, supra note 73,
§ 7.10 (explaining that "temporary rules" represent a "practical compromise
between the need for temporal urgency and the desirability of public participation
in the rulemaking process").
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lawmaking, including the need to identify specific legislative
authority, transparency, or a role for the courts.
Another "reason of national security" is secrecy. Judge Gonzales
explained that the Administration's long silence in disclosing the
procedure for enemy combatant designation was largely because the
deliberations involved in such a designation "invariably include
extraordinarily sensitive intelligence information that we are loathe
to reveal for fear that it may jeopardize the future capture of enemy
combatants and future prevention of terrorist attacks. 78
This claim of secrecy confuses the rules of law with their
application. It may well be the case that disclosure of how military
detention rules were applied to particular persons like Padilla or
Hamdi could compromise sources and methods of intelligence or
ongoing investigations to prevent terrorist attack. But it is
exceedingly difficult to see how disclosure of the rules themselves,
let alone of the general process by which they are applied, could do
the same. That the CIA compiles data, that the Office of Legal
Counsel issues a formal opinion, or that the White House Counsel
makes his own recommendation to and briefing of the President
regarding the designation of United States citizens as enemy
combatants is of no conceivable interest to our enemies, but of vital
interest to Americans concerned about arbitrary action and erroneous
designations. There was simply nothing in what Judge Gonzales
disclosed for the first time in a breakfast meeting with a bar
association committee in February 2004 that he could not have
disclosed a year or more earlier, or even disclosed before the
designation process was used. One cannot help suspecting that the
real secret was that, as an administration lawyer privately admitted
to Newsweek, "we were making this up as we went along."7 9 The
process could not be disclosed earlier because it did not yet exist, at
least in its present rococo form.
I would put the point more strongly yet. There is a nearly
irrebuttable presumption under the rule of lawmaking that the legal
authority and procedures for national security decisions by the
executive-as opposed to details of their application to particular
cases-should not be kept secret from the public. The executive
therefore has a heavy burden of proving a need for keeping legal
authority or lawmaking processes secret and a commensurate duty to
resist the hydraulic pressure to extend even appropriate secrecy to
78. Gonzales, supra note 47, at 11. Cf Juan R. Torruella, On the Slippery
Slopes of Afghanistan: Military Commissions and the Exercise of Presidential
Power, 4 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 648, 709 (2002) (stating that it was appropriate for
Administration not to follow the APA because of how the detainees were detained).
79. Michael Isikoff & Daniel Klaidman, The Road to the Brig, Newsweek,
April 26, 2004, at 26.
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inappropriate subjects. That burden has not been met by the
Administration with respect to the law of military detention or trial
by military commission and how it was made. Judge Gonzales'
extension of arguably appropriate secrecy concerning the application
of the law to the facts of Hamdi or Padilla to the rules of law and the
lawmaking procedures themselves also shows that the Administration
has not successfully resisted the pressure.
Ultimately, the proposition that national security and the war on
terrorism are too important, too big, for the conventional rule of
lawmaking has it exactly backwards. "The rule of law becomes more
vital," Judge Wood remarks, "not less so, when democracy is
attacked. 8°When democracy is under attack, and the nation is at
war, public trust in the executive is essential to victory. That trust "is
in large measure a function of maximizing public participation and
transparency and minimizing departures from normal governmental
practice. 81 Precisely because the President makes life and liberty
affecting decisions when he orders military detention or trial by
military commission of American citizens, the rule of lawmaking
applies with special force, and more, not fewer, lawmaking
procedures are required as a check on arbitrary power and as
assurance to the public.
When military orders, incommunicado detention, military trials,
and secrecy seem to replace a government of laws with a government
of men, it is natural to worry that bad men (or women) will seize and
abuse their power. I do not have that worry yet. It seems to me that
men of good faith are asserting power to protect us from terrorism,
not to aggrandize themselves or the President. The real danger to the
rule of law today is more insidious than a coup by bad men. It is the
erosion of the rule of law by sloppy, excessively secretive, and
irregular lawmaking, because good men don't see it.
80. Wood, supra note 67, at 470.
81. Fidell, supra note 6, at 379-80.
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